Behind the Pretext of “Security” : The Quiet Militarization of Civil Law Enforceme

By Kusnandar & Co., Attorneys At Law – Jakarta, Indonesia

 

Time and again, the public is asked to believe that the involvement of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) by the Attorney General’s Office is merely about “securing documents.” Yet this is precisely where the problem lies. The state has grown increasingly adept at blurring the line between civilian law enforcement and military presence through semantic maneuvering. When armed soldiers carry documents out of a civilian ministry, while authorities insist on calling it “data verification” rather than a “search,” public suspicion is not only justified—it is necessary. The concern is not merely about legal intent, but about how power is exercised, displayed, and communicated.

In a democratic system, language matters because it reflects intent and shapes public acceptance. By replacing terms like “search” with softer administrative phrases, the state attempts to neutralize public anxiety while maintaining extraordinary measures. This linguistic sanitization does not eliminate the coercive symbolism of military presence; it merely disguises it. The sight of uniformed soldiers performing tasks in civilian offices sends a message far louder than any press release.

The Attorney General’s claim that TNI involvement is “nothing new” only deepens the issue. Normalization is not justification. Indonesia’s 1998 Reformasi firmly established the principle of civilian supremacy, including in law enforcement. That principle was born from painful historical experience, when military dominance over civilian affairs eroded accountability and democratic control. When a civilian institution such as the prosecutorial system now feels compelled to “secure” an administrative process with military force, a fundamental question arises: is the state admitting the weakness of its own civilian apparatus, or quietly conditioning the public to accept the military’s return to civilian spaces?

The argument that documents might be “lost” or “misused” is equally troubling. If such suspicion is directed at a fellow state ministry, this is no longer simply a mining case in Konawe Utara—it is a reflection of a deeper crisis of trust among state institutions. The implicit message is stark: civilian bureaucracy cannot be trusted, therefore weapons must be present. This logic is dangerous, because it frames militarization not as an exception, but as a practical solution to administrative inefficiency.

Moreover, once security logic enters bureaucratic routines, it rarely retreats. What begins as “document protection” risks evolving into a default posture in sensitive cases, especially those involving large economic interests or political stakes. The result is a chilling effect on transparency, where the presence of armed personnel discourages scrutiny rather than ensuring integrity.

The Ministry of Forestry’s insistence that “no search took place” sounds defensive and overly legalistic. The public does not live solely within statutory definitions, but within visual and symbolic realities. When citizens witness soldiers transporting documents from a government office, the meaning conveyed is unmistakable: coercive state power is at work. If the state fails to grasp this perception and instead blames “social media narratives,” it reveals a widening gap between authority and the public’s sense of justice.

Ultimately, the core issue is not procedural legality, but the trajectory of habit being formed. Democracies do not collapse overnight; they erode through routines that go unquestioned. If every major case can be “secured” by military presence, civilian supremacy risks being reduced to mere rhetoric. Strong law enforcement is not upheld by the barrel of a gun, but by transparency, accountability, and the courage of civilian institutions to enforce the law independently. If this trajectory continues, what is at stake is not merely a single mining case—but the very character of democracy itself.

K&Co - January 9, 2026

The New KUHAP and KUHP : Legal Reform or Democratic Backsliding?

 By Kusnandar & Co., Attorneys At Law – Jakarta, Indonesia

 

The ongoing controversy surrounding Indonesia’s new Criminal Code (KUHP) and the proposed revision of the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) is not merely a technical legal debate. It is a contest over the future direction of Indonesian democracy. While the government frames these reforms as modernization and decolonization of the legal system, many citizens see something far more troubling: an expansion of state power, a shrinking civic space, and a weakening of fundamental legal safeguards.

In principle, a new KUHP and KUHAP should function as complementary instruments. Substantive criminal law must be balanced by procedural law that rigorously protects individual rights. Yet what is emerging instead is a dangerous imbalance. The new KUHP introduces broad and vaguely defined offenses—ranging from insults against the president and state institutions to threats against public order—while the draft KUHAP fails to significantly strengthen oversight over law enforcement authorities.

One of the central concerns in the KUHAP debate is the expansion of discretion granted to investigators and prosecutors without adequate checks and balances. Provisions governing arrest, detention, search and seizure, and surveillance remain weak in safeguarding due process. The rights of suspects risk being treated as procedural formalities rather than as substantive guarantees against abuse.

In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, the criminal procedure code is the last line of defense between citizens and the coercive power of the state. If this line is compromised, even a well-intentioned criminal code can become a tool of repression. When vague criminal provisions are paired with permissive procedural rules, the result is not justice, but institutionalized criminalization.

Government officials often dismiss public concern by insisting that law enforcement agencies can be trusted to exercise their powers responsibly. This argument is deeply flawed. Law is not designed to rely on the goodwill of those in power, but on robust mechanisms of accountability. Indonesia’s own legal history—marked by the criminalization of activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens—demonstrates how unchecked authority inevitably invites abuse.

The controversy also reveals a widening gap between policymakers and social reality. Public participation in drafting the KUHAP has largely been symbolic rather than substantive. Input from civil society, academics, and legal practitioners is frequently sidelined as obstruction rather than embraced as a necessary safeguard. This is especially dangerous given that criminal law represents the most severe instrument of state power.

More troubling still is the cultural impact these reforms may produce. The combination of restrictive speech offenses and weak procedural protections risks normalizing repression. When criticism becomes punishable and legal processes fail to protect the accused, society learns a simple lesson: silence is safer than dissent. Democratic erosion then occurs not through dramatic authoritarian shifts, but through the slow accumulation of legal constraints.

True legal reform is not measured by the replacement of old statutes with new ones, but by the extent to which law restrains power and protects citizens. If the new KUHP and KUHAP fail to address today’s concerns, they will not represent progress. Instead, they will mark the modernization of repression—wrapped in the language of reform.

K&Co - January 8, 2026

Tax Relief and the Test of State Commitment

By Kusnandar & Co., Attorneys At Law – Jakarta, Indonesia

 

The decision by Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi to exempt employees earning up to Rp 10 million per month from Article 21 Income Tax throughout 2026 signals a clear attempt by the state to stand with middle- and lower-income workers. At a time when global economic uncertainty persists and domestic recovery remains uneven, the policy reflects the government’s effort to safeguard purchasing power while maintaining social and economic stability.

Enshrined in Ministry of Finance Regulation (PMK) No. 105 of 2025, the policy places the burden of Article 21 income tax on the government for workers in five designated sectors: footwear, textiles and apparel, furniture, leather and related products, and tourism. These sectors are not chosen at random. They are labor-intensive industries that sit at the intersection of vulnerability and productivity—characterized by relatively modest wages, exposure to global demand shocks, and fluctuating business conditions.

By absorbing the tax obligation, the government effectively increases workers’ net income without imposing additional costs on employers. The mechanism—whereby the tax withheld is returned in cash to employees—ensures that the benefit is tangible rather than merely accounting-based. Given that household consumption remains the backbone of Indonesia’s economic growth, the multiplier effect of such a policy should not be underestimated.

Yet every fiscal stimulus carries trade-offs. The key question is not only who benefits, but also who is left out. While the Rp 10 million monthly income threshold appears inclusive, the sector-specific nature of the incentive raises concerns over horizontal equity. Workers with similar income levels and vulnerabilities in other sectors—such as logistics, the creative economy, or urban informal services—are excluded, despite facing comparable economic pressures.

Administrative requirements, including possession of a Taxpayer Identification Number (NPWP) or a National Identification Number (NIK) integrated with the Directorate General of Taxes’ system, also deserve attention. While these requirements align with the government’s long-term goal of strengthening tax administration and data integration, they may pose practical challenges. Non-permanent and freelance workers—the very groups this policy seeks to support—often operate in administrative gray areas. Without adequate outreach and assistance, the incentive risks being underutilized.

The policy further underscores the government’s evolving view of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool rather than merely a revenue-collection instrument. In certain circumstances, foregone revenue can be justified to prevent deeper economic contraction and social strain. The challenge lies in ensuring that such measures remain temporary, targeted, and subject to rigorous evaluation.

More fundamentally, tax relief should not become a substitute for deeper structural reforms. Expanding quality employment, strengthening protections for non-formal workers, and reforming wage-setting mechanisms remain essential. Fiscal stimulus can act as a buffer—it eases the burden—but it does not address the root causes of economic vulnerability.

Ultimately, the 2026 Article 21 tax exemption deserves recognition as a responsive and empathetic policy choice. It represents a tangible presence of the state in easing workers’ burdens. Its true test, however, will lie in consistent implementation, precise targeting, and the government’s willingness to complement short-term relief with long-term structural solutions.

K&C - January 8, 2026